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COMMENTS

INSIDE THE HUDDLE: ANALYZING
THE MEDIATION EFFORTS IN THE
NFL’S BRADY SETTLEMENT AND ITS
EFFECTIVENESS FOR FUTURE
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is ubiquitous throughout
professional sports disputes. 1 Teams negotiatea form of ADRwith
players over contracts.
Professional sports leagues send disputes to
arbitrationalso a form of ADR. 2 Still, leagues have yet to readily utilize one
of the fastest developing forms of ADR, mediation. 3 Although the sports
world is riddled with opportunitieslabor disputes, disciplinary disputes,
broadcast disputesparties in American sporting disputes have utilized
mediation on only a few occasions. 4 Recently, the number of issues
surrounding the National Football League’s (NFL) labor dispute proved too
contentious for the parties to negotiate themselves. With the looming
expiration of the league’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA)the
1. See generally Thomas A. Baker, III & Dan Connaughton, The Role of Arbitrability in
Disciplinary Decisions in Professional Sports, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 123 (2005); David Sirotkin,
Note, Disciplining the Disciplinary Systems in Professional Sports: An Attempt to Fix the Arbitrary
and Overreaching Disciplinary Powers of Sports Commissioners, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
289 (2009).
2. Sirotkin, supra note 1, at 291.
3. See IAN S. BLACKSHAW, SPORT, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 18–19 (2009); William K.
Slate II, The Growth of Mediation and Mediation in Sports Disputes in the US, Presented at the CAS
Symposium on Mediation in Lausanne, Switzerland (Nov. 4, 2000), in BLACKSHAW, supra note 3, at
67–68.
4. Major League Baseball (MLB) utilized mediation during the 1994 MLB labor dispute between
team owners and the MLB Players’ Association (MLBPA). During the MLBPA’s strike, the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) unsuccessfully intervened in an attempt to facilitate an
agreement between the players and team owners. James R. Devine, The Legacy of Albert Spalding,
the Holdouts of Ty Cobb, Joe DiMaggio, and Sandy Koufax/Don Drysdale, and the 1994–95 Strike:
Baseball’s Labor Disputes are as Linear as the Game, 31 AKRON L. REV. 1, 65 n.285, 66–67 (1997).
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league’s governing document that sets forth nearly every aspect of the league’s
operating proceduresthe parties chose to utilize mediation. Though the first
two attempts were unsuccessful, the parties ultimately reached an agreement.
Because mediation is seldom utilized in professional sports disputes, the
NFL’s use of mediation is an interesting test subject. If sports-related
disputants find mediation effective, it may lead to a new forum by which
professional sports leagues solve labor disputes and, consequently, an
abandonment of traditional resolution mechanisms, such as the legal system.
Determining the effectiveness of mediation in professional sports disputes
requires an analysis of the relevant factors, circumstances, and occurrences
that ultimately led to the settlement of the NFL’s labor dispute. An analysis of
each of the NFL’s mediation attempts will reveal the unique nature of a
professional sports dispute; specifically, how extraneous factorssuch as the
media, the legal process, and monetary gainaffect the parties’ motivations
and strategies and, in turn, the success of mediation.
This Comment will undertake an analysis of such factors throughout the
NFL’s mediation process and will conclude how parties, specifically
professional sports teams and players associations embroiled in a labor
dispute, can utilize mediation to settle their dispute. Part II serves as an
introduction to mediation, discussing its role and effectiveness in sports. Part
III discusses the background of mediation efforts throughout the recent NFL
labor dispute. Part IV dissects and analyzes the causal factors behind the two
failed mediations and the successful third mediation. Part IV’s analysis will
demonstrate how certain dynamics may influence the success of mediating a
professional sports labor dispute. Finally, based on the success of mediation
in the NFL’s labor dispute, Part V will suggest how mediation may be utilized
in future labor disputes in professional sports.
II. MEDIATION IN SPORTS
Mediation is a “voluntary, non-binding, ‘without prejudice’ process that
uses a neutral third-party (mediator) to assist the parties in dispute to reach a
mutually agreed settlement without having to resort to a court.” 5 As an
extension of negotiation, mediation allows the parties to create their own
solutions with the help of an unbiased mediator. 6 Though allowing the parties
to wield significant influence over the resolution of their dispute, professional
sports leagues have yet to utilize mediation on a consistent basis.
There may be some underlying reasons that owners and players rarely

5. BLACKSHAW, supra note 3, at 19.
6. Id.
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employ mediation. 7
Some sports-related issues require time-limited
arbitration, instead of mediation, in order to produce a quick result,
specifically with issues that relate to individual athlete participation.8
Additionally, mediation may not be appropriate for some types of sports
disputes. 9 Mediation is likely to fail if the dispute contains high levels of
conflict, low motivation to reach a solution, low commitment to mediate, a
shortage of resources, or involves parties with significantly unequal bargaining
power. 10
Still, business issues that surround professional sports, such as contract
disputes that are typically settled through negotiation, may also be appropriate
for mediation. 11 The personal nature of mediation can allow for sports
disputes to be resolved while preserving personal and business relationships.12
Unlike settling a dispute via the courts, mediation is geared toward future
possibilities in an effort to reach a solution, instead of asserting fault toward
another party. 13 In an attempt to find an amicable solution, mediation may
allow the parties to circumvent a harmful impasse by cooperatively
reestablishing communication and reaching a solution. 14 Yet, mediation still
requires willingness on behalf of the parties.
Some disputes may be ripe for mediation as a result of the dispute’s
underlying issues. Still, even if all signs point to mediation, it is essential that
the parties are “willing to utilize the mediation process to its fullest extent with
the primary goal being to resolve the dispute to the mutual satisfaction of those
involved.” 15 If parties do not enter mediation with that mindset, talks will
undoubtedly fail, evidenced by the NFL’s first two mediation attempts.
III. MEDIATION AND THE NFL LABOR DISPUTE
Over the course of the NFL’s labor dispute, there were three separate
mediation sessions. Each session contained varying circumstances and
7. See Slate, supra note 3, at 68.
8. Id.
9. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 3, at 132 (This includes, among others, matters where parties
may seek to employ legal precedent, want the mediator to enjoin a party, want to use mediation as a
punishment mechanism, or want the mediation and dispute to be highly publicized).
10. Id. at 133 (citing KENNETH KRESSEL, THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2000)).
11. Slate, supra note 3, at 68.
12. BLACKSHAW, supra note 3, at 129.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Bob Wallace, Mediation in Professional Sports Disputes, PROF. SPORTS AND THE L., July–
Aug. 2011, at 5.
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occurred in a unique context. The first mediation occurred two weeks prior to
the expiration of the NFL’s CBA. In the midst of contentious negotiations, the
NFL Players Association (NFLPA) and NFL team owners voluntarily
The parties employed the services of an
submitted to mediation.16
independent government agencyFederal Mediation and Conciliation
Services (FMCS)to act as a neutral, third-party mediator. 17 After nearly a
week of mediation, mediator George Cohen stated, “‘some progress was
made, . . . but very strong differences remain[ed] on the all-important core
issues that separate the parties.’” 18 Throughout the initial mediation, “sides
[talked] both in full groups and in smaller subcommittee meetings.”19
However, after meeting for a sixteenth day, the parties decided that they had
enough. 20 The owners locked out the players to force concessions at the
bargaining table, and the NFLPA disclaimed its interest in acting as the
players’ collective bargaining representative as a means to bring an antitrust
suit against the owners.21
With a lockout in place, the players were unable to play football;22 thus,
the players 23 brought a class action suit in federal district court against the
league in Brady v. National Football League. 24 The suit challenged the
lockout on antitrust grounds and sought injunctive relief. 25 At the same time,
several retired players, along with a few amateur players, 26 filed a similar suit
against the NFL in federal district court, arguing that the lockout could harm
their retirement benefits, which are subsidized by the NFL.27 The court
reassigned the retired players’ suit against the NFL to the judge presiding over

16. NFL, NFLPA Agree to Enter Mediation, ESPN NFL (Feb. 18, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.
com/nfl/news/story?id=6132690.
17. Id.
18. Mediator Says NFL, Union Make ‘Some Progress,’ SPORTING NEWS, http://aol.sportingnews
.com/nfl/feed/2010-09/nfl-labor-talks/story/mediator-says-nfl-union-make-some-progress (last visited
Nov. 18, 2011).
19. Id.
20. See Mark Maske & Amy Shipley, NFL Shuts Down After Talks Stall, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2011, at A4.
21. See Complaint, Brady v. NFL, No. 11-CV-639, ¶¶ 57, 63 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2011); Maske &
Shipley, supra note 20.
22. See Maske & Shipley, supra note 20.
23. The plaintiffs to the suit were made up of current and former NFL players as well as college
football players, but when this Comment discusses the lawsuit in Brady v. NFL, it will collectively
refer to the plaintiffs as “the players.”
24. See generally Complaint, Brady v. NFL, No. 11-CV-639 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2011).
25. See id. at 39, 41, 42, 49.
26. Collectively referred to throughout this Comment as “the retired players.”
27. See Complaint ¶ 111, Eller v. NFL, No. 11-CV-748 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2011).
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the players’ injunction hearing 28—United States District Judge Susan Richard
Nelson—and ultimately consolidated both the retired players’ and the players’
cases. 29
Although the first mediation failed and resulted in player-filed suits
against the NFL, the owners and players surprisingly agreed to pursue a
second mediation. 30 Still, like the hostile and contentious nature of the talks
that derailed the first mediation, the parties had strong, contradictory opinions
as to where the second mediation should take place.31 The players desired
court-annexed mediation that would occur under the supervision of the district
court in Minnesota, while the NFL proposed that the mediation occur back in
Washington D.C. with FMCS mediator George Cohen, the mediator who
presided over the first mediation. 32 The NFL suggested Cohen because he
“‘kn[e]w the issues . . . [and] the parties . . . [and was] effective at getting both
sides to look openly at each other’s positions and try to find solutions.’” 33 But
the players’ attorneys declined the proposal to resume mediation with Cohen,
stating, “‘collective bargaining between the NFLPA and the NFL is over.’”34
With the parties in disagreement as to where to hold the second mediation,
Judge Nelson stepped in.
Although hearing the parties’ arguments at an injunction hearing, Judge
Nelson refrained from making an immediate ruling. 35 Instead, Judge Nelson
mandated that the parties participate in court-supervised mediation to discuss
settling the players’ antitrust suit.36 Judge Nelson appointed federal Chief
Magistrate Judge Arthur Boylan to serve as the mediator. 37 Prior to the
mediation, Boylanwho had significant experience as a mediator 38met
28. See generally Order for Reassignment of Related Cases, Brady v. NFL, No. 11-CV-639 (D.
Minn. Mar. 29, 2011).
29. See generally Order for Consolidation, Brady v. NFL, No. 11-CV-639 (D. Minn. Apr. 11,
2011).
30. NFL, Players Want to Talk, ESPN NFL (Apr. 8, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/
news/story?id=6304671.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The letter continued to discuss the players’ concerns that the owners would use the
players’ agreement to mediate as a violation of labor laws; however, the owners stated that it would
give the players “‘reasonable and appropriate assurances . . . .’” Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Mark Maske, Judge Orders NFL Players, Owners to Begin Mediation Thursday, WASH.
POST, Apr. 12, 2011, at D3; see generally Mediation Order, Brady v. NFL, No. 11-CV-639 (D. Minn.
Apr. 11, 2011).
37. Mediation Order at 2, Brady, No. 11-CV-639.
38. NFLPA Lawyers to Talk with Judge, ESPN NFL (Apr. 12, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/
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with both parties to discuss the issues and engage in a “brokering” process,39
which involves the mediator reaching out in an effort to get to know the
parties and their respective issues. However, like the first mediation attempt,
the court-ordered mediation proved unsuccessful. 40 Officially termed by
Boylan as an “extended break,” after only four days of discussion, Boylan
ended the mediation and instructed the parties to reconvene nearly one month
later. 41
Although the parties were beginning to lose sight of their end
goalsettling the lawsuit and agreeing to a new CBACommissioner Roger
Goodell still had a grasp on the direction needed to end the dispute. Goodell
stated, “‘the players want solutions and I think the teams want solutions.
That’s why we have to be working at it in negotiations and figuring out how to
get to that point.’” 42 However, the parties’ ability to reach solutions would be
hampered by the legal process, which took hold of the dispute following the
end of the second mediation session.
Immediately following the failed talks, the district court sided with the
players and enjoined the lockout. 43 As a result, the owners appealed the ruling
to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 44 and the Eighth Circuit issued a
temporary stay of the district court’s ruling. 45 As each court handed down its
respective rulings, the date to renew the second mediation approached, and it
was uncertain whether the parties would reconvene or allow the legal process
to play itself out.
Ultimately, the parties chose to continue the second mediation in
Minnesota on May 16, 2011; 46 however, on the same day, the Eighth Circuit
granted the owners a permanent stay of the district court’s injunction that
lifted the lockout. 47 The Eighth Circuit’s ruling meant that the lockout would
nfl/news/story?id=6336516. In 2007, Boylan had mediated a $195 million settlement of a class
action suit for malfunctioning defibrillators and pacemakers. Id.
39. See Jon Krawczynski, Attorneys Meeting with Mediator Prior to Negotiations, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), April 13, 2011, at 43.
40. NFL Talks Adjourn Until May 16, ESPN NFL (Apr. 21, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=6395141.
41. NFL, Players Wrap Up Mediation, May Not Meet Again Until May 16, SI.COM (Apr. 21,
2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/football/nfl/04/20/mediation.ap/index.html?eref=sihp.
42. NFL Talks Adjourn Until May 16, supra note 40.
43. See generally Brady v. NFL, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011).
44. See generally Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Brady v. NFL, No. 11-1898 (8th Cir. Apr. 29,
2011).
45. See generally Brady v. NFL, 638 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2011).
46. For the purpose of this Comment, the reconvenence of mediation on May 16 will be
considered part of the “second mediation attempt.”
47. See Brady v. NFL, 640 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2011); Joe Reedy, NFL Lockout Remains in
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stay in place until the court heard the owners’ appeal on June 3, 2011,
intensifying, with reason, the belief that mediated talks prior to the oral
arguments would yield no result. 48 This was evidenced by the statements of
Drew Brees, New Orleans Saints quarterback and executive of the NFLPA,
who told reporters that the parties were “‘still pretty far apart’” in their
discussions. 49 With such a wide gap in the talks and the June 3 hearing
looming, the parties finished their second unsuccessful mediation attempt.50
The parties then made plans to engage in a third mediation attempt following a
hearing in front of the Eighth Circuit on June 3, 2011. 51
Although the parties agreed to set aside talks while each prepared its oral
arguments, on the eve of the June 3 hearing, the parties joined Boylan in
Chicago for discussions. 52 Most notably absent from the talks were both
sides’ legal counselBob Batterman and Jeff Pash for the NFL and Jeff
Kessler and Jim Quinn for the players.53 Instead, the NFL was represented by
Commissioner Goodell and five team owners, and the players were
represented by Executive Director DeMaurice Smith and current and former
players Kevin Mawae, Mike Vrabel, Jeff Saturday, Domonique Foxworth, and
Tony Richardson. 54 The discussionsthe parties’ third attempt to mediate the
disputewere, as the parties indicated in a joint statement, “‘confidential
discussions’” with Boylan “‘pursuant to court[-ordered] mediation.’” 55
The impromptu discussions, referred to by the media as “secret,” would
continue sporadically over several weeks. 56 Initially, although details of the
talks were to remain confidential per a court order, an anonymous source told
the media that the talks were yielding progress and that the parties were to

Place Until Full Appeal is Heard, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 17, 2011, at C3.
48. See Bob Glauber, NFL Lockout: Back to the Table, But Will They Talk?, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
May 15, 2011, at A71.
49. James Varney, Hazy Overtones; Fans Showed Up to Watch the Saints in a Charity Softball
Game, But It Was Overshadowed by the NFL’s Continued Lockout, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
May 18, 2011, at D1.
50. Dave Campbell, Mediation Over Till June 7; But NFL Owners Want Traditional
Negotiations, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 18, 2011, at 58.
51. Id.
52. Jarrett Bell, Lawyers Left Out of NFL Talks, USA TODAY, June 3, 2011, at 1C.
53. Greg A. Bedard, Secret NFL Talks Bode Well; Without Lawyers, Key Figures Met for Two
Days, BOS. GLOBE, June 3, 2011, at Sports, 2.
54. Id.
55. Joe Reedy, Sides Quiet After Talks, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 3, 2011, at D1.
56. Tom Rock, NFL Owners Meet Again with Players, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 8, 2011, at A55;
Pats Owner: ‘Good News is, We’re Talking’ About New Deal, USA TODAY, June 10, 2011, at 8C;
Report: NFL, Players Talk Again; Latest Round Set to Last Several Days, USA TODAY, June 8, 2011,
at 9C.
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meet “‘often . . . [and] in the near future . . . .’” 57 However, the talks
reportedly ended almost as quickly as they resurfaced when the parties’
lawyerspresumably Batterman, Pash, Kessler, and Quinnwere brought
back into the process but asked to “‘stand down’” after they became involved
in a heated exchange with one another.58 Nonetheless, due to its progress, the
“secret” discussions carried over into July 2011, as the parties eventually
moved the talks from Chicago and New York back to Minnesota, which at
times exceeded fifteen hours per meeting. 59
Amidst these lengthy mediation sessions, two legal developments
occurred that had the potential to bring an abrupt end to the parties’ settlement
discussions. On July 4, 2011, retired NFL players filed a second class-action
complaint against the players and owners in the District Court of Minnesota,
arguing that by negotiating settlement terms that involved the retired players,
the players and owners had violated antitrust laws.60 Moreover, on July 8,
2011, while the parties were engaged in their third mediation attempt and
seemingly making progress, the Eighth Circuit overturned the district court’s
finding that the lockout was a violation of antitrust law. 61 It initially appeared
that any progress made in the discussions would be immediately threatened.
Because Judge Nelson scheduled the hearing for the retired players’ complaint
for early August 2011, the immediate effect of the retired players’ attempt to
intervene in the mediations was unclear, but the Eighth Circuit’s ruling did
have the potential to instantly impact the mediation. It was reasonable to
believe that the ruling would tip the scales in favor of the owners; however, in
a move of solidarity, the parties issued a joint statement: “[The] ruling does
not change our mutual recognition that this matter must be resolved through
negotiation. We are committed to our current discussions and reaching a fair
agreement . . . .” 62 Although the parties sought to reassure the public that
discussions were yielding progress, another ill-timed occurrence took the
57. Barry Wilner, Productive Discussions Leading to Labor Optimism, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), June 9, 2011, at 49.
58. Report: A Near Blow-Up, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2011, at C7.
59. Bart Hubbuch, NFL Talks Look Promising Again, N.Y. POST, July 2, 2011, at 53.
60. Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Crossclaim, Eller v. NFL, 11-CV639 (D. Minn. July 4, 2011); Amended Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and
Crossclaim, Eller v. NFL, 11-CV-639 (D. Minn. July 13, 2011); Retirees File Complaint, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), July 5, 2011, at C1.
61. See generally Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011); Maury Brown, Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals Upholds NFL’s Lockout, League and Players Respond, THE BIZ OF FOOTBALL (July
8, 2011), http://bizoffootball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=851:eighthcircuit-court-of-appeals-upholds-nfls-lockout-league-and-players-respond&catid=54:nfl-labornews&Itemid=79.
62. Brown, supra note 61.
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proverbial wind out of the parties’ sails.
With the NFL’s season looming in the balance, and on the heels of the
court’s ruling and the parties’ statements, Boylan postponed the mediation
until July 19, 2011, while he went on vacation. 63 Without a mediator, the
parties were left to negotiate on their own. Though Boylan would be absent at
a highly critical time of the talks, prior to leaving, he instructed the parties to
continue their own discussions “‘in an effort to define and narrow the
differences between their respective settlement positions.’” 64 Following the
series of unfortunate events, the parties were faced with immense pressure and
a growing sense of urgency to reach an agreement.
A surprise to many, without a mediator, the parties began to make
significant strides toward a settlement. 65 The negotiation sessions, which at
the time bore the most progress to date, went on at times for fifteen hours.66
As strides were being made, Boylan ended his vacation and returned to lead
Amidst these
the discussions, which had moved to New York. 67
developments, the parties engaged in a symbolic gesture of cooperation by
inviting the retired players to join them in the discussions. 68 This was
significant because inviting the retired playersa party with a new landscape
of issuescould potentially impede the parties’ progress. 69 But following the
invite, the retired players’ attorney stated that “‘the retiree issues [we]re not an
impediment to a resolution,’” 70 and thus the talks continued. For the next few
days, talks progressed; on July 25, 2011, the parties settled the Brady lawsuit
and agreed in principle to a new CBA. 71 After a four and a half-month
lockout, NFL football was back. 72
Although the parties began their discussions as polar opposites, they
eventually came to a resolution. Though the effectiveness of mediation was

63. NFL Still Working Through Labor Deal; Owners, Player’s Union Will Meet as Judge Takes
a Vacation, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), July 10, 2011, at C8.
64. Id.
65. More Success at Labor Talks; Club Option Key to Rookie Pacts, BOS. GLOBE, July 15, 2011,
at Sports, 7.
66. Id.
67. Mediator Set to Rejoin Talks; NFL, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2011, at 2D.
68. Jarrett Bell, Hopeful Retirees to Rejoin Talks; League Seeking ‘Global Settlement’, USA
TODAY, July 19, 2011, at 8C.
69. See id.
70. Mark Maske, NFL Players Expected to Receive, Review Draft of Virtual Deal, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2011, at D3.
71. Bob Glauber, At Long Last, NFL Opens Doors; Players Approve Deal, So Football is Back
After 4 1/2-Month Lockout, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 26, 2011, at A58.
72. Id.
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unclear during the dispute, by its end, mediation had helped the parties frame
the important issues and move toward a settlement. With several professional
sports labor disputes on the horizon,73 it would behoove each respective
league and players’ association to consider utilizing mediation. Using the
NFL’s labor dispute and mediation attempts for guidance, other leagues may
look to the factors, circumstances, and occurrences that may cause mediation
to fail, as well as succeed, as a catalyst toward a resolution.
IV. THE FAILURES AND TRIUMPHS OF MEDIATION DURING THE BRADY
SETTLEMENT TALKS
The three mediation attempts were surrounded by some similar factors;
however, each session was impacted by its own nuanced circumstances.
Moreover, as an attorney representing the retired players put it, the mediation
and the entire dispute centered on ‘“the structure of the game and the
relationship between the rookies, the active players, the retirees, with each
other and the league.”‘ 74 The parties’ initial failure to properly consider and
protect those relationships, in addition to other contributing factors, led to two
unsuccessful mediation attempts. Yet, in the end, the parties reached an
agreement. To truly understand how mediation affected the NFL’s labor
dispute and how to utilize the process for future professional sports labor
disputes, it is important to analyze the factors and circumstances surrounding
each mediation attempt.
A. Why the First Mediation Failed
The first mediation attempt, which occurred under the guise of CBA
negotiations, failed as a result of—among other factors—the structure of the
talks, the public nature of the dispute, and the parties’ underlying motivations.
This section will discuss the aforementioned factors in detail and how they
adversely affected the initial mediation.
1. Lack of Face-to-Face Dialogue
When mediating, the mediator must choose whether to employ joint

73. The National Basketball Association locked out its players following the 2010–2011 season.
Brian Mahoney, First Effect of Lockout: No Show of Free Agents: Work Stoppage Shows No Sign of
Reversing Course Amid NBA Labor Dispute, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Idaho), July 2, 2011.
Additionally, MLB’s CBA expires in December 2011, and the National Hockey League’s CBA
expires in Summer 2012. Id.
74. NFL Mediation Wraps Third Day of Talks, ESPN NFL (Apr. 19, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.
com/nfl/news/story?id=6388965.
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meetings or to engage in “shuttle diplomacy.” 75 A joint meeting puts the
parties in the same room for most of the session so they may discuss and
explore underlying issues and potential solutions face-to-face. 76 Shuttle
diplomacy, on the other hand, puts the parties in separate caucus rooms with
the mediator acting as an intermediary. 77
The type of mediation a mediator will conduct will be determined by the
issues surrounding the dispute and how well the mediator can gauge the
parties’ emotions and motivations. “[P]arties [may be] preoccupied with
discussion of economic issues in their prior negotiations,” and as a result, they
may have “exchanged very little information about the concerns that led to
proposals on noneconomic topics.” 78 To that extent, joint meetings “have
utility as a starting point” to focus the parties’ attention on many underlying
issues regardless of the length of previous discussions. 79 Opting to utilize
shuttle diplomacy may present obstacles for both the mediator and the
respective parties. 80 The mediator bears the burden of getting each party to be
fully candid; 81 the back-and-forth process can be frustrating for the parties.
Based on the players’ comments and frustrations surrounding the initial
mediation, it appears as though Cohen chose to utilize shuttle diplomacy more
heavily than joint meetings, which resulted in few face-to-face meetings.
Arizona Cardinals’ kicker Jay Feely described the players’ frustrations from
his experience of two days of mediation:
I sat up there [for two days], all day and I spent thirty minutes
total in front of the owners. So we’re spending all day up
there yet not having the dialogue, not having the
communication with the owners. We’re up there for . . . 17
days or so[.] [I]n the total mediation process we may have
spent an aggregate total of twenty hours in front of the owners
in that entire time. 82

75. SAM KAGEL & KATHY KELLY, THE ANATOMY OF MEDIATION: WHAT MAKES IT WORK 114
(1989).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Posting of Mike Florio, Jay Feely Interview Transcript, PFT (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:04 PM EST),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/03/14/jay-feely-interview-transcript/. NFLPA President
and former player Kevin Mawae made similar claims, stating that the players sat in mediation “for 16
hours . . . [but] met face-to-face [with the owners] a total of [only] 30 minutes.” NFL Capsules: Lead
Negotiator Says NFL Proposed 10-year CBA, BROWNSVILLE HERALD, Mar. 14, 2011, http://www
.brownsvilleherald.com/sports/nfl-123936-proposed-capsules.html.
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Feely continued to express his frustration that the initial mediation was
void of direct dialogue between the parties and would have benefited from
more face-to-face meetings. 83 Additionally, according to some players, when
the parties actually met face-to-face, it was the owners’ attorneys who engaged
in most of the discussions. 84
Although it is a party’s prerogative to choose to defer representation and
bargaining power to an attorney, doing so may create or exacerbate
frustrations. Because of the salient, monetary issues underlying the dispute, it
is understandable that the parties entrusted a significant amount of authority to
their respective attorneys. However, engaging in more face-to-face, intimate
discussion may move the parties away from positional bargaining and toward
interest-based bargaining, by which the parties explore mutual gains and a
win-win result instead of individual gains and a win-lose result. Engaging in
such face-to-face discussions to develop interest-based bargaining requires the
attendance and earnest participation of the parties central to the disputehere,
the owners and playerswith decision-making authority.
2. Lack of Proper Participation
Because mediation has the ability to change the parties’ perceptions of the
issues and of each other, it is imperative that those directly impacted by the
dispute, those who represent and influence the viewpoints of a respective
party, and those with the actual authority to make decisions are present for
each session. 85 Failure to include such necessary persons in the mediation can
have gross negative effects. For one, the absence of those with actual control
over a respective party’s bargaining position means that the negotiation efforts
within mediation are all for naught. A mediator cannot be expected to
facilitate discussion and explore the parties’ interests when a party to the
mediation cannot accurately represent or bargain for those interests.86
Moreover, the other party may perceive the absence of vested persons at
mediation as a severe lack of respect, which only further distances a possible
settlement.
Evident from the reactions to the initial mediation, it appears that both
parties failed to send the necessary representatives. At the initial mediation,
the owners were represented by a ten-member Management Council Executive
83. Jay Feely Interview Transcript, supra note 82.
84. Posting of Ken, NFL Network’s Rich Eisen Talks with Colts Center Jeff Saturday About
Lockout, FANG’S BITES (Mar. 28, 2011), http://fangsbites.com/2011/03/nfl-networks-rich-eisen-talkswith-colts-center-jeff-saturday-about-lockout/.
85. See KAGEL & KELLY, supra note 75, at 110.
86. See id.
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Committee, while the players were represented by an eleven-member
executive committee. 87 Although each party present at mediation represented
a large number of individualsthirty-two owners and thousands of
playersas well as a variety of opinions that accompany such large memberbased entities, it stymies mediation if each representative, as well as the
principals to the dispute, are not present throughout the process. In the first
mediation, several representatives and high-profile disputants were not in
attendance.
During the first seven days of mediation with Cohen, the players sent nine
members of their eleven-person executive committee. 88 Still, noticeably
absent throughout the first mediation were two of the most well-known
plaintiffs to the suit, Indianapolis Colts quarterback Peyton Manning and New
England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady. 89 Similarly, the owners had not sent
a single owner to the first seven days of mediation; instead, Commissioner
Goodell, lead negotiator Jeff Pash, and attorney Bob Batterman represented
the owners at mediation. 90 By the twelfth mediation session with Cohen, the
owners’ contingency had remained small, represented only by Goodell, Pash,
Batterman, and just one owner, New York Giants co-owner John Mara.91
Even on the day the CBA was set to expire, several key members of the
owners’ executive committee chose not to attend the session.92 It was not
until the ninth session, a little over twenty-four hours before the mediation was
abruptly halted by the NFLPA’s disclaimer of interest, that the owners sent
nine of their ten committee members to the mediation, with one participating
via telephone. 93
One player attested to the owners’ representatives at mediation, stating
that
“[e]very single player on the executive committee was at the
87. See Albert Breer, Owners Receive Update on CBA Mediation from NFL Officials, NFL (Feb.
26, 2011), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81e7e87e/article/owners-receive-update-on-cbamediation-from-nfl-officials; Bob Glauber, Lockout Looms at Midnight; No Progress in Talks
Between NFL Owners, Union; Without Unexpected Breakthrough, Stoppage Likely, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), Mar. 3, 2011, at A54.
88. Breer, Owners Receive Update on CBA Mediation from NFL Officials, supra note 87.
89. Posting of Mike Florio, Brees Says He Likely Will Attend Future Mediation Sessions, PFT
(Apr. 16, 2011, 11:33 AM EST), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/04/16/brees-says-helikely-will-attend-future-mediation-sessions/.
90. Breer, Owners Receive Update on CBA Mediation from NFL Officials, supra note 87.
91. Gary Myers, NFL Back on Clock as Talks Resume, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 8, 2011, at 60.
92. See Glauber, Lockout Looms at Midnight; No Progress in Talks Between NFL Owners,
Union; Without Unexpected Breakthrough, Stoppage Likely, supra note 87.
93. Sam Farmer, Players Ready for Next Step; Deadline Looms Friday for New CBA;
Decertification Likely, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2011, at C4.
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mediation every single day. We always had people with
influence there. They had nobody with decision-making
capabilities . . . . Most of the time, most of the owners weren’t
even there. . . . Any proposal we made, they’d have to leave the
room to make a million phone calls.”94
Regardless of whether the owners did in fact fail to send a contingency
with the proper authority, the perception that such persons were absent clearly
harmed the parties’ relationship.
3. Presence of Media Coverage
Another potential factor as to why the initial mediation attempt failed is
the highly publicized nature of the dispute. Due to the popularity of the NFL,
the dispute between the players and team owners was of great national interest
and was reported on by nearly every news outlet. Both sides fed the media
firestorm by granting interviews and publicly sharing confidential
information. 95 Mediated discussions are “never helped if the parties try to
carry on a media campaign with the press.” 96 A mediation where the parties
publicly comment about the process and the other party while the process is
ongoing creates “a danger that only part of the story will be reported,” which
causes further difficulties for the parties in settling the dispute.97
Although Cohen encouraged both sides to keep discussions confidential, 98
his desires did not stop the parties from talking to media outlets. During the
first mediation, NFLPA executive DeMaurice Smith publicly shared the
owners’ proposals, calling them “‘utterly meaningless’” as each side continued
to criticize the other’s bargaining position.99 Moreover, throughout the
process, anonymous “person[s] familiar with the negotiations” continually
reported to the media the state of the mediation and the displeasures of each
party. 100 Such disregard for the mediator’s request for confidentiality worked
to undermine the process. Every detail of mediation that was leaked to the

94. Ken Murray, Cornerbacks Have the Lockout Covered; Foxworth Updates Ravens; Carr
Learns Pre-Law Lessons, BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2011, at 1D.
95. See Posting of Mike Florio, First Day of Mediation Includes “Tough” Talks, “FenceMending”, PFT (Apr. 14, 2011, 9:53 PM EST), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/04/14/firstday-of-mediation-includes-tough-talks-fence-mending/.
96. KAGEL & KELLY, supra note 75, at 9.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Gary Mihoces, Cohen Keeps Talks on Track; NFL, Union Give Credit to Mediator for WeekLong Extension, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2011, at 6C.
99. Howard Fendrich, Owners Give a Little; Players Unimpressed, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2011,
at Sports, 3.
100. Id.
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public attached a considerable amount of tension and pressure to the parties.
4. Lack of Transparency
A key to successful mediation and negotiation is transparency on the key
issues underlying a dispute. That is not to say that this requires a party to
share all of its information and relinquish its bargaining advantage; instead, to
appease the other party’s concerns and to reduce high transaction costs in
pursuit of a mutually beneficial solution, parties will have to share at least
some basic information. For instance, throughout the NFL labor dispute, one
of the key issues was how to distribute $9 billion of revenue. 101 Because the
monetary distribution involved so much money, one of the players’ biggest
concerns was receiving assurances from the owners that the players would
receive ten years of the teams’ audited financial information. 102
The owners initially balked at the idea of sharing such a large quantity of
team financial information.103 But ultimately, the owners relented and offered
to disclose five years of audited profitability information, stressing the fact
that the owners themselves were not privy to any of it.104 Reportedly, the
players turned down the offer, instead wanting a complete look at the clubs’
books. 105 In characterizing the discussions between the players and owners,
DeMaurice Smith explained, “‘[t]he last 14 days, the National Football League
has said, “Trust us.” But when it came time for verification, they told us it
was none of our business.’” 106 Whether the owners should have disclosed a
complete record of team finances is not within the scope of this analysis.
However, the owners’ reticence and lack of transparency clearly had an
adverse impact on the initial mediation. The players were unwilling to
continue while the owners were content with the breadth of information they
had provided to the players. As the deadline for the expiration of the CBA
approached and with neither party willing to bend, it started to become quite
clear that the mediation efforts were not going to succeed.

101. Howard Fendrich, A Lockout is Imposed by Owners; Dispute Spirals into Court as Players
Decertify, Sue, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 12, 2011, at 27.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Sam Farmer, NFL; NFL Owners Believe Their Offer Was Fair, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011,
at C5.
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5. Imposition of a Deadline
Throughout the first mediation, the players and owners were constantly
facing deadlines. The first mediation began only two weeks prior to the
expiration of the NFL’s CBA. 107 Although the parties twice extended the
deadline, 108 the looming threat of a lockout by the owners and a subsequent
disclaimer of interest by the players’ union may have jeopardized discussions.
It may seem that a deadline for such actions would move the parties towards
settlement; however, such tactical methods may have instead hardened the
parties’ positions. The parties may have entrenched their bargaining positions
due to the fact that each had a means to exit mediation; specifically, the
owners could institute a lockout and the players could choose to decertify or
have the union disclaim. Further, it is likely that each party’s alternatives
caused much hostility during the mediation, as neither party believed the other
had engaged in genuine discussions. 109
Overall, each of the aforementioned factors had a role in derailing the
parties’ first mediation attempt. The contentious nature of the talks made it
unlikely that the parties would again seek to utilize mediation during the
dispute. However, approximately one month after the failed mediation
attempt, Judge Nelson ordered the parties back to mediation. Because the
factors surrounding the failed first mediation were never addressed and the
parties allowed new issues to surface, logic would dictate that the second
attempt would fail as well.
B. Why the Second Mediation Failed
Because the NFLPA disclaimed its interest in representing the players in
collective bargaining in order to bring an antitrust suit against the owners, they
were forced to operate as a trade association, which lacks the protection of
federal labor lawnamely, the statutory or nonstatutory labor exemptions.110
Now outside of the collective bargaining context, any concerted activity
conducted by either party could potentially be construed as a violation of
antitrust laws. 111 As a result, the parties had to exercise caution in their
107. NFL, NFLPA Agree to Enter Mediation, ESPN NFL (Feb. 18, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.
com/nfl/news/story?id=6132690.
108. Mark Maske, NFL Talks Extended Again, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2011, at D1.
109. See NFL, NFLPA Agree to Enter Mediation, supra note 107. This notion is evidenced by
the owners’ decision to file an unfair labor practice with the National Labor Relations Board against
the players prior to the initial mediation, alleging the players’ lack of good faith bargaining. Id.
110. See MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 437–39 (2d ed. 2009).
111. See id.; David A. Donohoe & Maiysha R. Branch, Can a Litigation Settlement Violate the
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discussions, which largely impacted the success of the second mediation
attempt. The analysis that follows explores exactly why the second mediation
was unsuccessful.
1. The Looming Legal Process
Mediation is a self-determinative process, a form of negotiation by which
the parties choose how to craft a settlement. 112 The process keeps all
dispositive decisions in the parties’ hands and away from a judge or arbitrator.
However, in the NFL labor dispute, the parties’ blending of mediation with the
court system, specifically the players’ and retired players’ respective suits in
Minnesota and their unfolding legal circumstances, worked to undermine a
mediated solution. The parties’ failure to reach a timely settlement according
to Judge Nelson’s timetable allowed the court to grant the players’ claim for
injunctive relief. 113 This set in motion a series of legal proceedings, as the
owners appealed to the Eighth Circuit,114 and the Eighth Circuit stayed the
district court’s ruling. 115 By allowing a neutral third-party to issue a binding
decision while the parties were still involved in mediation, the parties may
have doomed the talks from the start. In particular, immersing the dispute in
both mediation and the courts may have caused the parties to approach
discussions without settlement as a realistic objective but instead with a focus
on gaining the most leverage. 116 Because “[b]oth sides [thought] they [could]
win in court, . . . neither want[ed] to do anything in mediation that might
[have] damage[d] their chances. Thus mediation [was] a song and dance . . .
done to satisfy Judge Susan Nelson and football fans . . . .” 117 Attorney Jeff
Pash, lead negotiator for the NFL, credited Boylan but blamed the looming
legal process for the failed talks, saying that the parties’ attempt at mediation
has been ‘“artificial . . . [and] all within the context of ongoing court
cases.’” 118 These legal issues undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the
Antitrust Laws?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Dec. 2000, available at http://www.akingump.com/
files/Publication/84d11dce-c9cf-488e-ba46-8f97bd2b1b30/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/960f444a-41cc-493e-913b-488c3e5c26b/311.pdf.
112. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 3, at 18–19.
113. See generally Brady, 779 F.Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011).
114. See generally Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Brady v. NFL, No. 11-1898 (8th Cir. Apr. 29,
2011).
115. See generally Brady, 640 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2011).
116. See Judy Battista, N.F.L. Talks are Stalled; Sides Await Judge’s Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2011, at B14.
117. Mike Freeman, Second Round of Mediation Mostly for Show, CBSSPORTS.COM (Apr. 17,
2011), http://www.cbssports.com/#!/nfl/story/14958810/second-round-of-mediation-mostly-for-show.
118. Judy Battista, Uncertainty as Owners Convene, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at B15.
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parties’ underlying motivations throughout the second mediation.
2. Lack of Proper Participation
Unlike the failed mediation efforts in Washington D.C., the courtsupervised mediation was reportedly conducted through joint meetings, with
the parties regularly meeting face-to-face, 119 and with the presence of persons
from both sides with proper decision-making authority. 120 In advance of the
talks, Judge Nelson specifically requested that both parties send
representatives with such authority 121 so that if the parties did come to
agreeable terms, they could immediately hash out a deal. On the first day of
the mediation, the owners were represented by team owners Robert Kraft of
the New England Patriots, Jerry Richardson of the Carolina Panthers, Clark
Hunt of the Kansas City Chiefs, Art Rooney of the Pittsburgh Steelers, Atlanta
Falcons President Rich McKay, Commissioner Goodell, and lead negotiator
Attorney Jeff Pash. 122 The players were represented by then-Kansas City
Chiefs linebacker Mike Vrabel, then-free agent linebacker Ben Leber, NFLPA
Executive Director DeMaurice Smith, outside counsel Attorney Jeffrey
Kessler, retired player Carl Eller, and the retired players’ lead counsel
Attorney Michael Hausfeld. 123
Still, several key members of the players’ contingency were absent. Drew
Brees, a vocal member of the players’ executive committee and party to the
lawsuit, failed to attend several sessions.124 Also absent were seven other
named plaintiffs to the suitmost notably Peyton Manning and Tom Brady,
both of whom were also absent at the first mediation. 125 Moreover, neither
DeMaurice Smith nor the players’ attorney Jeffrey Kessler attended all of the
sessions during the second mediation. 126
The owners had similar representation issues, continually rotating owners
to attend the sessions. 127 Take for instance the failed May 16 discussions.
119. Sean Jensen, NFL Lockout; Agreement Could Be Far Off Still, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 16,
2011, at 43.
120. Albert Breer, Round 2 of NFL-Player Mediation Begins with ‘Fence-Mending’, NFL (Apr.
14, 2011), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81f3f553/article/mediation-20-nfl-players-atnegotiating-table-again.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Brees Says He Likely Will Attend Future Mediation Sessions, supra note 89.
125. Id.
126. NFL Mediation Wraps Third Day of Talks, supra note 74.
127. Posting of Mike Florio, Three New Owners Will Attend Mediation on Tuesday, PFT (Apr.
18, 2011, 10:31 PM EST), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/04/18/three-ne-owners-will-
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Like the first mediation, the owners failed to send all ten members of their
labor committee.128 It is difficult for serious progress to be made when any
decision must get approval from all committee members and then all thirtytwo owners, especially when representatives are continually subbed out.
Moreover, without intimate knowledge of the potential progress or developing
rapport, which would be available only to those who have continually spent
time meeting with the other party, alternating representatives miss out on
imperative details of the previous discussions or have to start from scratch.
The absence of those who make up part of the dispute’s identity, including the
parties’ strong vocal supporters or high-profile members, both of which
existed in this particular dispute, serves to undermine the negotiating process.
Their absence is a strong symbol for apathy. At the very least, if either side
lacks full representation, it behooves both parties to agree on a respective,
uniform negotiation strategy and to detail its reservation points and “Best
Alternative[s] To a Negotiated Agreement” 129 to demonstrate a commitment
toward settlement.
3. Presence of Media Coverage
During the second mediation efforts, Judges Nelson and Boylan directed
the parties to keep the mediation process confidential.130 As a player
representative noted, “‘[a]nyone that characterizes [details of the mediation]
publicly violates that confidentiality.’”131 Even with the court’s gag order,
because the NFL is such a high-grossing, popular sport, media coverage of the
dispute was tremendous. The pressures of keeping the process confidential,
combined with the incessant prodding of the media, certainly affected the
relationship of the parties. For example, in his comments following one of the
court-ordered sessions, Drew Brees was quick to criticize and blame the
owners for stalling the process. 132 Similarly, plaintiff Mike Vrabel questioned
whether the owners had “‘any sense of urgency’” to settle the matter.133 On
the owners’ side, New York Giants co-owner John Mara made headlines after
he published an essay detailing his personal frustration with the discussions on
the Giants’ and NFL’s websites only a few days following the failed
attend-mediation-on-tuesday/.
128. Reedy, NFL Lockout Remains in Place Until Full Appeal is Heard, supra note 47.
129. See Ruth D. Raisfeld, ADR: A User’s Guide, 31 WESTCHESTER B. J. 71, 78 (2004).
130. Bob Glauber, NFL: League Cuts Employees’ Pay, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 23, 2011, at A30.
131. Id.
132. See Varney, supra note 49.
133. NFL’s Jeff Pash: Progress Made in Talks, ESPN (May 17, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=6559848.
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mediation. 134 In any context, a party’s decision to publicly speak out against
the other side only works to antagonize and, in turn, significantly jeopardize
the parties’ relationship and motivation to cooperate. Among other factors, the
lack of any type of public censure during the third mediation likely contributed
to its success.
C. Why the Third Mediation Succeeded
Because of the failures of the first two mediation attempts, commentators
had little hope for the third attempt when it was reported that the parties had
again sought to utilize mediation. As former NFL executive Andrew Brandt
stated, “‘the timing of this mediation does not lend well to concessions from
either side. . . . [The parties] will do enough to make Boylan feel that they are
engaged and active while being reluctant to make any substantive moves with
[the Eighth Circuit oral arguments] around the corner.’” 135 As the two failed
mediations demonstrated, external factors could impair the parties’ bargaining
relationship and impinge settlement. The third mediation attempt was filled
with factors similar to the previous two attempts; however, the third mediation
also contained many unique factors that ultimately helped the parties reach an
agreement. This section will discuss those particular factors and the role each
played throughout the third mediation attempt.
1. Presence of Media Coverage
As the parties indicated in a joint statement, their third attempt to mediate
the dispute consisted of confidential meetings with Boylan that were convened
“pursuant to court[-ordered] mediation.” 136 Although both parties had
previously ignored the court’s initial gag order, the parties’ joint statement and
reticence to speak to the media indicated their commitment to keeping the
details of the mediation confidential. Because of the lack of details leaked
during the third mediation, the media dubbed the talks “secret,” a revealing
statement considering that, based on the court’s gag order, the talks were
always meant to remain confidential. Some rightfully believed that the lack of
details and updates was a sign of the parties’ progress. 137 Ultimately, the
parties’ continued refusal to comment on the third mediation made a positive
impact on the talks, as it kept all finger-pointing and disclosure of the parties’

134. Gary Myers, Giants’ Mara Warns of Chaos, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), May 20, 2011, at 72.
135. Glauber, NFL Lockout: Back to the Table, But Will They Talk?, supra note 48.
136. Reedy, Sides Quiet After Talks, supra note 55.
137. See Sides Meet Well Into the Night; Owners, Players Talk 13-Plus Hours, BOS. GLOBE, July
1, 2011, at Sports, 8.
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bargaining positions private.
2. Proper Participation
Like the previous mediation attempts, both parties failed to send every
member of their respective committees to the third mediation.138 Though the
absence of all relevant persons was initially a big concern in the previous
mediations, the parties still made progress throughout the third session with
some key parties absent. 139
In particular, the absence of each party’s legal counsel—Bob Batterman
and Jeff Pash for the NFL and Jeff Kessler and Jim Quinn for the players—
during a period of the third mediation attempt served as an important
development. 140 It may have been pure coincidence, but it was at that time
that the parties began to make significant strides toward a settlement. When
the parties did invite their lawyers back to mediationpresumably signaling a
readiness to discuss terms of a settlementemotions ran high, causing some
notable conflict. 141 Ultimately, however, as progress continued, the parties’
counsel gathered their composure and took on an important role closing the
deal as the talks winded down. 142
Additionally, as talks continued, the owners and players invited the retired
players to join the discussions. 143 This, too, was an important development in
the talks, as it signaled cooperation among all those involved and quelled, at
least for the time being, the retired players’ concerns.144
3. The Looming Legal Process
Unlike the other mediation attempts, the partieswhether truthful or
notattested that the legal process did not affect the talks. 145 At the time the

138. See Bell, Lawyers Left Out of NFL Talks, supra note 52.
139. See id. Though some speculated that the absence of the lawyers was not necessarily a sign
of progress, its overall effect on the mediation proved this speculation to be inaccurate. Id.
140. Report: NFL, Players Talk Again; Latest Round Set to Last Several Days, supra note 56;
Rock, supra note 56; Pats Owner: ‘Good News is, We’re Talking’ About New Deal, supra note 56.
141. See Report: A Near Blow-Up, supra note 58.
142. Howard Fendrich, NFL Lockout; Owners Could Ratify Deal on Thursday, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 19, 2011, at 42; Barry Wilner, NFL’s Talks Take 2; Sides Hope Plan Leads to New Deal, BOS.
GLOBE, July 6, 2011, at Sports, 6.
143. Bell, Hopeful Retirees to Rejoin Talks; League seeking ‘Global Settlement’, supra note 68.
144. The retired players ultimately filed suit against the NFLPA, arguing that the NFLPA lacked
the authority to negotiate with the NFL for retired players’ benefits. See Class Action Complaint ¶
134, Eller v. NFLPA, 11-CV-2623 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2011).
145. See Brown, supra note 61.
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discussions began, the Eighth Circuit had yet to issue its final ruling; but,
based on its stay of the district court and its business-friendly jurisprudence, it
was evident to many that the court would side with the owners. 146 To the
parties’ credit, when the Eighth Circuit ultimately found for the owners, there
were no signs that the ruling was a surprise for either side, as the parties issued
a joint statement to the effect that the parties would continue their discussions
and work to reach a fair agreement for both. 147
4. The Financial Consequences
Perhaps the biggest impetus for an agreement between the parties was the
financial consequences of not settling the lawsuit. Though the prospect of
losing significant revenue always threatened to end the NFL’s work stoppage,
each day that passed led to concerns that the league would have to cancel
preseason games. Reportedly, each week of the preseason generated
approximately $200 million in revenue for the league. 148 As lawyer and
player agent Ralph Cindrich put it, “‘[i]t is now that time when pressure has to
be put on both sides . . . . This is just too strong of a business not to find a
solution’” and “‘to mess with this successful business will have a devastating
effect.’” 149 Because the owners and the players, through the split of league
revenue, stood to lose a significant amount of money if the lockout continued
into the season, the parties became more motivated to find ways to end the
dispute. The time constraints may have impacted the previous mediations in a
sense that the parties were willing to wait out the dispute; however, once the
parties entered their third separate mediation session, the timetable had
significantly narrowed.
5. Face-to-Face Dialogue
Finally, in addition to the aforementioned factors, a significant reason the
parties were able to reach an agreement was their face-to-face dialogue. As
previously mentioned, joint discussions, which occur in-person, can be more
effective than any form of shuttle diplomacy. Though Boylan conducted joint
sessions throughout the third mediation, the most progress seemed to occur
when the parties were left to negotiate face-to-face by themselves. When
146. Brad Biggs, Settle it Yourself, Judge Advises; NFL Labor; 8th Circuit Panelist Warns
Neither Side is Likely to be Happy with Court’s Ruling, BALT. SUN, June 4, 2011, at 1D.
147. See Brown, supra note 61.
148. Mark Maske, NFL Owners, Players Repair Rift Before Halting Negotiations for the
Weekend, WASH. POST, July 3, 2011, at D1.
149. Barry Wilner, Sides Picking Up Pace in NFL; Goodell, Smith Set to Negotiate Today, BOS.
GLOBE, July 7, 2011, at Sports, 6.
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Boylan left for vacation, he instructed the parties to continue their discussions
and work to find the differences between their positions.150 The parties
responded by conducting marathon negotiation sessions and closed the gap on
several key issues. 151 When Boylan returned, the parties had fewer issues to
resolve, and, with the help of Boylan, they reached a settlement.152 Though
Boylan was absent for parts of the discussions, which thus caused the talks to
be characterized as negotiation instead of mediation, the impact of mediation
was significant. The relative success of mediation in the NFL’s labor dispute
leaves open the prospect that other professional sports leagues may utilize this
process in future labor disputes.
V. LOOKING FORWARD
The use of mediation in the NFL’s labor dispute reveals the unique nature
of a professional sports dispute. Parties’ traditional, strategic approaches to
such disputes have led to an increased reliance on the court system after initial
negotiations fail. Once a professional sports dispute enters the courts, it faces
a heightened public scrutiny, which puts a great deal of pressure on the court
to impose a resolution. As the NFL’s labor dispute demonstrated, the court
system does not always provide an adequate remedy for the parties. Instead,
as was the case with the NFL’s labor dispute, putting the ultimate solution in
the hands of the parties allows a mutual agreement. However, as the NFL’s
labor dispute also demonstrated, the parties’ failure to remain fully committed
to mediating a dispute will derail the process. As a result, if professional
sports leagues are to mediate their labor disputes, parties to the dispute must
enter the process voluntarily and remain committed for its duration.
To ensure parties’ commitment to mediating a professional sports labor
dispute, it would be beneficial for the process to be memorialized in a league’s
CBA. Similar to how a league’s CBA contains provisions subjecting certain
disputes to arbitration,153 mediation would be the default resolution
mechanism for labor disputes. However, the parties would have to explicitly
provide that the provision survives the expiration of the CBA’s substantive
terms. By including such a “survival” provision in the CBA, the parties will
voluntarily submit themselves to mediation and remain committed to utilizing

150. NFL Still Working Through Labor Deal; Owners, Player’s Union Will Meet as Judge Takes
a Vacation, supra note 63.
151. More Success at Labor Talks; Club Option Key to Rookie Pacts, supra note 65.
152. See Glauber, At Long Last, NFL Opens Doors; Players Approve Deal, So Football is Back
After 4 1/2-Month Lockout, supra note 71.
153. See, e.g., NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, arts. XV,
XVI, XLIII (Aug. 4, 2011).
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the process even after the CBA has expired. Contractual enforcement of the
provision would ensure that the parties undertake mediation in good faith and
avoid taking labor disputes through the court system as a default. The NFL’s
labor dispute portrayed the negative effects of such tactics, but also revealed
the positive effects of mediation, which may make the use of mediation in
professional sports labor disputes viable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, within professional sports labor disputes, the parties engage
in drawn-out negotiations where each side tries to gain leverage at the
bargaining table. As evidenced by the NFL’s labor dispute, this leverage may
be achieved through the courts or, in other disputes, through an arbitrator. The
courts and arbitration, which both make binding rulings, are fraught with
uncertainty, tension, and dissatisfaction. With mediation, however, the
solution is self-determinative, and the parties take the reins in choosing how to
resolve their dispute.
As demonstrated from the failures and ultimate success of the mediation
efforts within the NFL’s labor dispute, mediation can help the parties
communicate, draw out the emotions, frame the issues, and maintain workable
relationships upon reaching an agreement. Though neither the mediator nor
the parties perfectly effectuated the mediation process by its end, each party’s
efforts reflect the efficacy of utilizing mediation in professional sports
disputes. The parties’ initial unwillingness to utilize the benefits of the
mediation process was evident by their conflicting strategic objectives.154
Yet, though coupled with financial and legal considerations, once the mediator
was able to frame the issues and focus the parties on interest-based bargaining,
talks progressed and the parties reached a settlement. The dynamics at play
throughout the NFL’s labor dispute mediation, both adverse and effective
toward a resolution, provide invaluable guidance for other professional sports
leagues as they move toward impending labor disputes and pressures as to
how to settle each matter. Mediation is an emerging and effective dispute
resolution mechanism that all professional sports leagues and players
associations would be well-served to utilize.
Timothy J. Bucher

154. See Wallace, supra note 15, at 5.

